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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JEFF SHIPLEY,

p f a l W /

VS.

T H E I N D U S T R I A L C O M M I S S I O N Case No.
OF T H E STATE OF UTAH,
13639
C & W CONTRACTING COMPANY
and T H E T R A V E L E R S
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
Answer of Defendants to Brief of Plaintiff on the Final
Order from the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah

DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's brief states that Dr. Ward B. Studt's
opinion was that Mr. Shipley is "unemployable". Plaintiff failed to point out that the doctor's opinion is
based upon his examination of the plaintiff conducted
in 1971. H e testified at the Commission hearing that
the disability rating he gave in his letter was based upon
1
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the Colorado standard and "represents a permanent
responsibility of the [Colorado] Industrial Commission." [Tr. 173]. Upon cross examination, Dr. Studt
stated that he has "no disagreement" with the Utah
Panel's finding of 50% permanent disability for Mr.
Shipley. [Tr. 176]. I t is of interest to note that Dr.
Studt's medical report filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah states that the x-rays disclose an old
fracture of the D-12 vertebra of Mr. Shipley. [Tr. 3l.
The Statement of Facts in plaintiff's brief also
calls for clarification on other points. A substantial
part of the so-called disability and physical condition of
Mr. Shipley, as set forth in the plaintiff's brief, is
based upon Mr. Shipley's self-serving statements. That
is true of the opinions of Mr. Karl F . Kraync and Mr.
Lynn Greenwood, stressed in plaintiff's brief. Even
the Medical Panel had to re^ly somewhat on Mr. Shipley's complaints made to the members of the panel.
Incidentally, it is to be noted that Mr. Kranyc's letter
of August 15,1972, addressed to the Commission, failed
to mentioned Dr. Pemberton's medical report on file
there. [Tr. 114].
I n plaintiff's brief it is claimed that Travelers did
nothing to prove Mr. Shipley's employability. Contrary to that statement, Travelers, in an effort to
learn the complete medical facts in the case, sent Mr.
Shipley to Dr. Pemberton for examination in February, 1971. [Tr. 87]. Also, in January of 1972, Travelers recommended to Dr. Munsey, plaintiff's family
doctor, that Mr. Shipley be sent to another orthopedic
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physician. Dr. Sherman S. Coleman's examination is
summarized in the Medical Panel's report. [Tr. 127].
Both Dr. Pemberton and Dr. Coleman are outstanding orthopedists. Dr. Pemberton's report states that
his examination of Mr. Shipley "shows him to walk
without a limp. H e has some moderate restrictions of
motion in the lumber spine." [Tr. 7]. In his report,
Dr. Pemberton estimated that Mr. Shipley's "present
permanent partial disability rating" if he has no back
surgery, to be about 40% of the body, whereas if Mr.
Shipley were to have a spinal fusion, "he could go back
to work with probably 20% permanent partial disability." [Tr. 8]. Dr. Studt's report of April 3, 1971,
recommends that Mr. Shipley probably would do well
to accept Dr. Pemberton's disability estimate. [Tr. 12].
In his letter of April 12, 1971, to Travelers, Dr. Studt
stated that his estimate of the permanent disability rating for Mr. Shipley under the Colorado law would
"seem compatible with Dr. Pemberton's rating."
[Tr. 2].
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts also failed to mention that Dr. Coleman's report of January 26, 1972,
addressed to Dr. J . P . Munsey, stated the x-rays of
Mr. Shipley disclosed an old deformity of the left hip,
existing prior to the subject accident; and it is difficult to explain why Mr. Shipley had a series of lumbar
spine x-rays in 1967. [Tr. 71]. Dr. Coleman further
commented in his letter that after reviewing Mr. Shipley's case, "it becomes increasingly difficult to explain
his persistent pain on the basis of residuals of the injury." [Tr. 71].
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For defendant to have investigated further the
condition of Mr. Shipley's disability would be a practical impossibility. To verify his claim of disability
would no doubt have required the bugging of his home
and the shadowing of his activities, and even those
might) have proven inadequate.
The medical examinations and undisputed reports
of the doctors in this case are the most reliable and
proper means of determining the degree of Mr. Shipley's permanent disability.
In line with the medical reports contained in the
case, Travelers has paid Mr. Shipley the sum of $6,053.54 for temporary total disability and $2,168 for
permanent partial disability pending the final decision
in this case; and additional sums for the hospital and
medical expenses of Mr. Shipley, including medications [Tr. 105-113, 217].
The findings in the report of the Medical Panel
appointed by the Industrial Commission are to be considered factual evidence in each case, and this court so
holds; Jensen v. United States Fuel Co. 18 U 2d 414,
424P.2d440 (1967).
Finding No. 1. covers the temporary total disability item [Tr. 131].
Finding No. 2 is as follows:
"As a reasonable medical probability, there is 50%
permanent partial disability of the body as a whole as
a result of this accident of October 27, 1969.
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Finding No. 3 refers to Mr. Shipley's peripheral
vascular disease.
Finding No. 4 states that there is no evidence of
a respiratory or cardiac problem.
Finding No. 5 states that Mr. Shipley "is taking
an inordinate amount of medication" in view of the objective physical findings. [Tr. 131].
In Finding No. 6 the Panel found that Mr. Shipley "reached a fixed state some time ago. . ." [Tr. 131].
The Medical Panel had before it all of the physicians' reports contained in the record; and conclusions
of the Utah Board of Education on the subject of employability of Mr. Shipley. Defendants respectfully
call attention to the results of the Panel physical examination of Mr. Shipley, which certainly does not
call for more than a finding of 50% permanent partial
disability. I t is immaterial whether or not the hearing
examiner submitted to the Panel an explicit question
as to the total disability, since the Panel is empowered
to find and could find such disability if it believed the
facts so warranted. More important, the decision as
to the disability of a claimant is reserved by law to the
Commission. Sec. 35-1-85, U.C.A., 1953; Crittendon
vs. Industrial Commission, 25 U2d 193, 479 P.2d 347
(1971).
Plaintiff would have the case turn upon Mr. Shipley's claim of "unemployability", but that is not the
proper measure of a disability rating under the Workmen's Compensation Act. See 35-1-66, UCA, 1953,
5
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annotated; and Wilstead v. Industrial Commission, 17
U2d 214, 407 P2d 692 (1965). The findings of the
Industrial Commission do contain a reference to the
unemployability factor. Also see 35-1-67, UC A,1953#
That statute refers to "loss of bodily function". And
see the case of Markus v. Industrial Commission, 5
Utah 2d 347, 301 P2d, 1804, (1956). In that decision,
involving a back injury and an appeal by the employee,
this Court ruled upon section 35-1-66, UCA, 1953, on
partial disability as follows:
"This section gives the commission discretion in
its rating of loss of bodily function, which we
cannot disturb unless clearly arbitrary. When
the legislature authorized awards for other disfigurements or losses of bodily function which
are not scheduled in the act, it apparently had in
mind awards of proportionate amounts for disfigurements or losses of bodily function of similar nature to those scheduled."
Also, it is to be noted that certain parts of Mr. Shipley's
testimony and evidence relating to the employability
aspect of the claim cast serious doubts on that contention.
Let us see what Mr. Shipley and his wife stated
at the Commission hearing concerning his condition of
disability. H e testified at both Commission hearings
that he has made no attempt or effort to find employment since the subject accident. [Tr. 90, 195]. At the
hearing of September 12, 1973, he stated that he drove
his car from Moab to Salt Lake on the previous day
and that after about two hours of driving he "usually
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stops and walks around some." [Tr. 192]; that at such
times he has some pain in his back. H e works in his
garden at home, and sleeps "pretty good." H e further
testified that he does not take a nap in the day time
because he would then not sleep at night; that he does
rest some after lunch. [Tr. 193, 194]. H e can tolerate
the pain he occasionally has without medication most
of the time but that he takes Demerol and a Soma
compound "as a muscle relaxer" [Tr. 194]. When
asked if his wife gave him assistance in moving around
and doing things for him he answered, "Oh, not a
whole lot. I help myself mostly. I can do a lot of
things. I don't lift heavy things, if I can keep from
it." H e said that he does not use his cane when in the
house but he uses it pretty much. [Tr. 195]. Mrs. Shipley testified that her husband goes down to the coffee
shop and then back to his house, and that is his "usual
daily pattern." [Tr. 203]. She also stated that Mr.
Shipley turns the water on the lawn and goes out to
the garden and "fools around awhile." [Tr. 202].
Mr. Shipley further testified that social security
payments received on behalf of himself, his wife, and
boy at the time of the September 1973 hearing
amounted to $458.00 per month, of which $242.00 is for
Mr. Shipley's disability, frr. Adfi),
Defendants question the reliability of Mr. Kraynac's opinion concerning Mr. Shipley's condition. That
opinion was based "somewhat on which Mr. Shipley
told him". Mr. Kraynac stated that he is no medical
expert, and that he was furnished only medical records
7
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by "the disability determination unit of Social Security." [Tr. 180]. Evidently he did not have before him
or even consider the reports of Dr. Pemberton or Dr.
Coleman,
Mr. Lynn Greenwood testified on behalf of plaintiff. H e stated that he is employed by the Utah Department of Employment Security as a vocational
counsel and that his opinion of Mr. Shipley's condition results from a one hour interview, and he had
never seen any medical records in the case. H e further
testified that his opinion is based "substantially" upon
plaintiff's statement to him.
The Court's attention is called to the fact that both
35-1-66, U.C.A., 1953 (partial disability) and Section
35-1-67, U.C.A. 1953, speak of "loss of bodily function." Section 66 clearly indicates that the measure of
disability is the particular loss of bodily function
whether it be covered by the types of injuries therein
listed or by any other type of injuries. Section 67,
pertaining to total disability, shows that the function
of the rehabilitation division follows the commissions'
findings of permanent total disability. In plaintiff's
brief he is trying to reverse the procedure by saying
that if the vocational rehabilitation division finds that
plaintiff is unemployable, then the commission must
so find. Plaintiff would substitute the opinions of the
rehabilitation people, who are really untrained in medical matters, for the expert opinions of the members of
the medical panel and for the findings of the Industrial
Commission.
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Defendants respectfully submit that the evidence
in this case is more than adequate to support the order
of the Industrial Commission, and calls for the affirmance of its award.
DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT
AND AUTHORITIES
Plaintiff's contention is that the order of the Commission denying plaintiff recovery in this case is beyond the power of the Commission and is arbitrary
and capricious. An important factor in this case is the
report of the Medical Panel. Plaintiff never made an
objection to the panel report and, in fact, in his letter
to the Commission, plaintiff accepted the report "on
the condition that the Medical Board finding of a 50%
permanent partial disability is viewed only as a medical
finding of physical impairment, reserving for the Commission the legal conclusions as to whether or not the
Claimant is permanently and totally disabled by considering in addition to the physical impairment the
economic and employment-related factors." [Tr. 139].
In the Findings and Conclusions of the Commission
the hearing examiner comments that plaintiff has accepted the Panel report. [Tr. 219]. In Sec. 35-1-77,
U.C.A. 1953, the duties and the purpose of the Medical Panel are stated. I t is obvious they are just as the
aforesaid letter of the plaintiff sets out: that the report
is deemed evidence and "the commission may base its
findings and decision on the report of the panel, but
shall not be bound by such report if there is other
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substantial conflicting evidence in the case which supports a contrary finding by the commission."
In the case of Jensen v. United States Fuel Company and the Industrial Commission of Utah, supra,
this Court acknowledged the value of an impartial medical panel:
". . . Its proper purpose is limited to medical
examination and diagnosis ,the evidence of which
is to be considered by the Commission in arriving at its decision."
As this court has often held, the rule in such a
case as we have here is that the plaintiff has the burden to affirmatively establish his claim. See the case
of Garner v. Hecla Mining Company, 19 U2d 367,
431 P.2d 794; (1967) where the court stated:
"It is the prerogative of the Commission, and not
of any individual witness, or even of the medical
panel, to judge the credibility of the evidence,
and upon the basis of the whole evidence to determine the facts. The plaintiff having failed to
so persuade the Commission, it is the duty of this
court to survey the evidence in the light most
favorable to the findings and order; and we cannot reverse and compel an award unless there is
credible evidence without substantial contradiction which points so clearly and persuasively in
plaintiffs' favor that failure to so find must be
regarded as capricious and arbitrary. Conversely, if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence,
or from the lack of evidence, which will justify
the refusal to so find, we must affirm."
The Garner opinion then cited in support of its
ruling the case of Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89
10
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Utah 381, 57 P.2d 724 (1936) and Vause v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 P.2d 1006
(1965).
The statute setting forth the authority of the Industrial Commission of Utah is stated in Section 351-85, U.C.A., 1953. That provision, construed by this
court in many decisions, is as follows:
"The findings and conclusions of the commission
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and final
and shall not be subject to review; such questions
of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the commission."
The court's attention is called to the extensive annotations in that section.
In Wilstead v. The Industrial Commission of
Utah, supra, this court was asked to review an order
of the Industrial Commission to have a disability award
increased to give plaintiff further compensation. The
Commission had found the plaintiff sustained severe
back injuries and was unemployed for more than a year,
and that he was finally re-employed in his former position. Plaintiff claimed that he should have total disability for additional time until the medical advisory
board give him a disability rating. The court observed:
"The important point to note here is that compensation during total disability does not necessarily mean until the employee is able to do his
former work."
This court affirmed the award of the Commission, thus
denying plaintiff's claim for the disability payments.
11
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The rule of law well established by this court in reviewing the orders of the Industrial Commission is well
stated in the case of Vause v. The Commission, supra.
While the facts involve an occupational disease, the decision is applicable here. We quote from the decision
affirming the award:
"This court cannot properly reverse the Commission and compel an award unless there is
credible evidence without substantial contradiction which points so clearly and persuasively in
plaintiff's favor that failure to so find would
justify the conclusion that Commission acted
capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably in disregarding or refusing to believe the evidence."
The opinion of Justice Crockett in the above decision also contains this statement:
"The weakness in plaintiff's position is one not
uncommon in appeals to this court: of becoming
so absorbed in his own contentions and so preoccupied with the assumed righteousness of his
own case that he is unable or unwilling to give
proper consideration to the countervailing evidence. Such an intransigent approach is certainly of no help to the court, nor is it of any advantage to the party involved. I t is a disserve to
to any cause to make unsupportable claims for
it, because discovery of the fallacy tends to discredit and weaken the entire case and thus to
impair whatever merit it may have. Our statutory and decisional law require us to look at the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's finding, and it is the obligation of the
parties involved to so present the matter to the
court."
12
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A later decision of this court approved the aforesaid rule set forth in the Vause case, supra, and Garner vs. Hecla Mining Company, supra. See Duaine
Brown Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Commission, 511
P.2d 743, 29 Utah 2d 478 (1973).

PLAINTIFF'S AUTHORITIES
Plaintiff's brief cites in support of his total disability argument, Spring Canyon Coal Company vs.
Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 103, 277 P . 206;
United Park City Mines Company vs. Prescott, 15
Utah 2d 410; 393 P.2d 800 and Morrison Knudsen
Construction Company vs. Industrial Commission, 18
Utah 2d 390, 424 P.2d 138.
I n the Spring Canyon case the plaintiff suffered
a very serious leg disability, with partial paralysis in
both legs so that he needed two canes for getting about;
the finding was that he could really use his body only
from the waist up. In spite of those injuries, this
court reversed the commission's award and reduced the
percentage of disability. The United Park City case
and the Morrison Knudsen decision are readily distinguishable from the instant case. In both decisions this
court affirmed the order of the commission awarding
permanent total disability. In each case the injuries
were much more serious and severe than those suffered
by Mr. Shipley. In the United Park City case the
employee suffered an amputation of the leg at the knee,
13
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and it was very difficult to apply an artificial limb.
I n each case the employee attempted or performed
some work after the industrial accident.
Plaintiff also cites and quotes from Caillet v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760
(1936). That decision involved much more serious
injuries than we have here and is a case in which this
court affirmed the order of the Industrial Commission. The said quote used by plaintiff shows that decision to be no authority for plaintiff's argument
since the case refers to a stiuation where "the evidence
conclusively shows that the employee is permanently
and totally disabled." W e do not have that situation
with Mr. Shipley. The decision also points out that
the employee must make a real effort to obtain work
after the aci«dent if he is at all able to perform some
work.
Plaintiff's argument also relies upon the text
known as Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law,
Section 5750, and speaks of an "odd-lot" doctrine. An
examination of Mr. Larson's annotations in support
of that section discloses that the cases nearly always
inviove much more serious injuries than we have here,
and usually refer to decisions affirming the particular
state's industrial commission. Some of Larson's cases
involve a jury. Many of the decisions he cites point
out that the particular employee made a real effort
to obtain some work after the accident. H e cites the
Utah case of Caillet v. Industrial Commission, supra<
The facts and the law in each case Mr. Larson cites
14
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must be examined because the applicable statute in
each state varies from state to state. In fact, his text
does not mention the type of procedure now existing
in Utah where the award of the Industrial Commission
cannot be disturbed except as provided in Section 351-84, U.C.A. 1953.
Plaintiff's argument, especially at page 11 and
12 of his brief, ignores the findings of the Medical
Panel and the authoritative decision handed down by
the Industrial Commission. Plaintiff states that in our
case the examiner and the commission appear to have
decided the case by some compromise "not permitted
by law and the undisputed facts here." In view of the
Medical Panel's report, the reports of the examining
physicians, Drs. Coleman and Pemberton, as well as
the testimony of Dr. Studt that he has no disagreement with the panel's finding of 50% permanent disability, how can it be said that the examiner and the
commission acted arbitrarily or resorted to compromise
in arriving at the award. I t is apparent that plaintiff
ignores the standard for review by this court as set out
in the aforesaid section, 35-1-84, U.C.A. 1953.

CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully submit that neither the
record in this case nor plaintiff's argument establishes
that the Industrial Commission has exceeded its powers
or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner under the
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law by its order denying plaintiff's application for a
compensation award of permanent total disability.
The Workmen's Compensation laws of Utah and
the decisions of this court clearly establish that the Industrial Commission's Order and its award of 50 percent
permanent partial disability should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
W . J . O'Connor, J r . of
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants C & W
Contracting Co. and The Travelers
Insurance Co.
Vernon G. Romney
Attorney General of the State of Utah
Utah State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Industrial Commission
of Utah
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